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COMMENTS

A FUNNY THING HAPPENED ON THE WAY
TO THE COURTROOM: SPOLIATION OF
EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS
KRISTIN ADAMSKI*

INTRODUCTION

In February 1989, Dr. Narendra Gupta performed surgery on
Cindy Miller's left foot.' Two years later, in March 1991, Ms.
Miller consulted a different doctor, Dr. Hess, due to additional
problems with the same foot; she was experiencing stumbling and
loss of balance.! Dr. Hess informed Ms. Miller that her condition
might have been due to malpractice on Dr. Gupta's part,3 but that
he needed to examine the x-rays that were taken of her foot both
before and after the February 1989 surgery.4 Thus, in August
1991, Ms. Miller's attorney requested that Dr. Gupta provide the
x-rays.
In October 1991, just before leaving his office for the evening,
Dr. Gupta removed Ms. Miller's x-rays from her medical file,
placed them in an x-ray jacket, and then placed the jacket on the
Rather
floor about three feet away from a wastebasket.6
predictably, the cleaning woman, who was in the habit of throwing
out x-ray jackets that were located in or near Dr. Gupta's trash,
threw out Ms. Miller's x-rays.7 Ms. Miller's x-rays were later
destroyed in the hospital incinerator.8 Without the necessary xrays, Ms. Miller could not obtain the certificate of merit required
* J.D. Candidate, June 1999.
1. Miller v. Gupta, 672 N.E.2d 1229, 1230 (Ill. 1996).
2. Id.
3. Specifically, "Hess told Miller that she suffered from a transfer wound
and misalignment of her toe...." Theodore Postel, Medical Malpractice:
Missing x-ray, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 11, 1997, at 1.
4. Miller, 672 N.E.2d at 1230.
5. Id. at 1231.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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for the filing of a medical malpractice suit,9 and her malpractice
suit was dismissed.1" By allowing the necessary x-rays to be
destroyed, Dr. Gupta escaped any liability for his possible
malpractice and deprived Ms. Miller of any chance to bring a
malpractice suit." Dr. Gupta's actions in this case are known as
"spoliation of evidence."
Spoliation of evidence refers to "[t]he intentional destruction
of evidence ... or the significant and meaningful alteration of a
document or instrument." 2 One court has narrowly defined the
term "spoliation" as the "failure to preserve property for another's
use as evidence in pending or future litigation.",3 Spoliation of
evidence also includes concealing evidence or even tampering with
witnesses." One author's survey stated that fifty percent of all
litigators believe that spoliation of evidence, in any of its forms, is
a pervasive problem, and one which they have experienced at some
time in their careers. 15
9. 735 ILCS 5/2-622(g) (West 1994).
10. Miller, 672 N.E.2d at 1231. Ms. Miller was given leave to amend her
complaint in conformity with the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Boyd v.
Traveler's Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995), which held that a "cause of
action for negligent spoliation of evidence can be stated under existing
negligence law." Miller, 672 N.E.2d at 1233. Thus, Ms. Miller must show that
Dr. Gupta had a duty to retain her x-rays. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270. See infra
notes 166-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the x-ray
Retention Act, 210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994), does not apply to Dr. Gupta as a
private physician.
11. Miller, 672 N.E.2d at 1232. "[W]ithout the x-rays, Miller [could] not
assert a meritorious cause of action." Id. Because Miller was unable to
comply with section 2-622 by obtaining a certificate of merit before filing her
medical malpractice suit, the trial court dismissed Miller's medical
malpractice claim. Id.
12. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990). Spoliation of evidence
may also be defined as "the failure to preserve property for another's use as
evidence in pending or future litigation." Terry R. Spencer, Do Not Fold
Spindle or Mutilate: The Trend Towards Recognition of Spoliation as a
Separate Tort, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39 (1993-94).
13. Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 724 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
This unpublished case was the first in California to define the term
"spoliation" in this context. Id. at 729. A similar definition is the "failure to
preserve property, either intentionally or negligently, for another's use as
evidence in pending or future litigation." Kelly P. Cambre, Spoliation of
Evidence: Proposed Remedies for the Destruction of Evidence in Louisiana
Civil Litigation, 39 LOy. L. REV. 601, 603 (1993).
14. Anthony C. Casamassima, Spoliation of Evidence and Medical
Malpractice, 14 PACE L. REV. 235, 235 (1994). Spoliation of evidence destroys
the discovery process and the truth-seeking processes therein. Id. Thus, there
are three main purposes for classifying spoliation of evidence as tortious
conduct: to promote truth-seeking; to promote fairness in the litigation
process; and to preserve judicial integrity. Id. at 239.
15. Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation:
The Need for Vigorous JudicialAction, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 793 (1991).
Of a survey of antitrust attorneys, 69% responded that the most common
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Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois

This Comment examines the need for an independent tort of
spoliation of evidence in Illinois, concentrating specifically on
cases of medical malpractice. Part I of this Comment explains the
background and examines the elements of this tort. Part II
examines remedies for destruction of evidence other than the
establishment of a new tort, and examines why these remedies are
ineffective to deter spoliation of evidence. Finally, Part III of this
Comment discusses a new remedy for the destruction of evidence.
Specifically, Part III proposes that Illinois adopt a new tort, that of
intentional spoliation of evidence. 6
I.

THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE SPOLIATION TORT

In Illinois, the Supreme Court has narrowly rejected the
intentional spoliation tort.17 The Court stated that a plaintiff
unethical practice they have encountered is spoliation of evidence. Id. "'[I]t
would be difficult to exaggerate the pervasiveness of evasive practices,'
including intentionally withholding evidence." Id. (citing Wayne D. Brazil,
Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its PrincipalProblems and
Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 829 (1980)). The problem of
spoliation of evidence is compounded by the fact that many civil cases settle
before trial, thus greatly reducing the chance that a spoliator will be caught
and punished. Eric Marshall Wilson, The Alabama Supreme Court Sidesteps a
Definitive Ruling in Christian v. Kenneth Chandler Construction Co.: Should
Alabama Adopt the Independent Tort of Spoliation?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 971, 972
(1996).
16. Courts adopting this tort will need to answer questions regarding who
has a duty to preserve evidence, when the cause of action for spoliation of
evidence arises, whether the plaintiff must lose the underlying claim before
bringing a claim of spoliation of evidence, and how damages are calculated.
Charles A. Cohn, Tort and Other Remedies for Spoliation of Evidence, 81 ILL.
B.J. 128, 129 (1993). Any court recognizing this tort must also "identify ... a
legally-protectable interest and then apply the traditional tort elements to
that interest." Pati Jo Pofahl, Smith v. Superior Court: A New Tort of
Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 961, 962 (1985). Finally,
if there are any criminal statutes dealing with destruction of evidence, the
court must decide whether the criminal statutes pre-empt the possible civil
action. Id. However, the mere existence of a potential criminal penalty does
not automatically bar the creation of a civil tort remedy, as the two remedial
schemes serve different purposes.
Andrea H. Rowse, Spoliation: Civil
Liability for Destruction of Evidence, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 198 (1985).
Criminal penalties are designed to protect society as a whole, while tort
remedies are designed to compensate injured individuals.
Id. at 199.
Spoliation of evidence is "both a crime against the state and a tortious act
against the individual." Id.
17. See Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ill. 1995) (holding
that "an action for negligent spoliation of evidence can be stated under
existing negligence law without creating a new tort"). Therefore, a plaintiff
must plead and prove that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to
preserve that evidence. Id. Further, the First District held recently that the
statute of limitations on a negligent spoliation of evidence cause of action is
five years. Cammon v. West Suburban Hosp. Med. Ctr., 704 N.E.2d 731, 740
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
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already has a cause of action for negligent spoliation of evidence
under existing negligence law; thus, in the Court's view, there was
no need to adopt a new tort. 18 However, in order to state a cause of
action for negligent spoliation in Illinois, a plaintiff must plead
and prove the traditional negligence elements of duty, breach of
duty, causation, and damages. 9 With this statement, the Court
highlighted the main problem with a cause of action in negligence
for spoliation of evidence; mainly, that there is no general duty to
preserve evidence.' ° Thus, if a plaintiff cannot establish a duty on
the defendant's part to preserve evidence, then a plaintiff has no
cause of action in Illinois even for negligent spoliation of evidence.
Furthermore, except under limited circumstances, "Illinois
law does not require health care providers to retain their patient
medical records for any particular length of time."" Thus, health
care providers have no general duty to preserve patient records."
It is clear in this situation that recognizing the separate
intentional tort of spoliation of evidence would address this
situation.
Section A discusses the historical background of
spoliation." Section B briefly addresses the first jurisdictions to
adopt spoliation as a tort in modern times. 4 Finally, Section C
discusses the elements of the tort as first set forth in the
18. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270.
19. Id.
The First District recently further examined the pleading
requirements for a negligent spoliation cause of action. In Jackson v. Michael
Reese Hosp. and Med. Ctr., the court stated that in order to state a duty to
preserve evidence, a plaintiff must plead fact-specific conduct to demostrate
defendant's assumption of that duty. 689 N.E.2d 205, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
Further, in order to show proximate cause, a plaintiff must show that but for
the spoliation there was a reasonable probability of succeeding in the
underlying lawsuit. Id. at 214. Finally, the plaintiff must plead specific
allegations as to the nature of damages he suffered. Id. at 216.
20. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270. This holding was contrary to several previous
appellate court decisions.
See Matthew S. Hefflefinger, Remedies for
Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois: The Arrival of the Cause of Action, 42 ILL.
ST. B. AsS'N TRIAL BRIEFS, Jan. 1997, at 1-4. See, e.g., Shelbyville Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Sunbeam Leisure Prods. Co., 634 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(holding that preserving the allegedly defective product in a product liability
suit is vital to both the proof and the defense of such suits); American Family
Ins. Co. v. Village Pontiac GMC, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 1115, 1118 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that sanctions for the failure to preserve evidence may be
imposed even in the absence of a court order barring destruction); and Graves
v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679, 681-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that even where
there is no court order to preserve evidence, parties must preserve that
evidence which they know or should know will be used in litigation).
21. Douglas Rallo, No Cure Yet For Spoliation of PatientRecords, CHI. B.
ASS'N REC., Oct. 1992, at 30.
22. Id.
23. See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
background of spoliation of evidence.
24. See infra notes 35-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of other
jurisdictions that have adopted the spoliation tort.
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California case Solano v. Delancy.5
A. HistoricalBackground
Court decisions detailing spoliation of evidence date back at
least as far as the eighteenth century case Armory v. Delamirie,
in which the plaintiff, a chimney sweeper, brought a jewel to a
goldsmith to have it appraised.2 7 The jeweler's apprentice removed
the stone and gave the plaintiff only what the setting was worth.2
The plaintiff refused this small sum and asked for the jewel back. 9
However, the jeweler refused to return the jewel, returning only
the empty socket.30 The plaintiff sued to recover the value of the
jewel; however, the jewel had disappeared by the time of trial.31
The court instructed the jury that in determining damages, they
should assume the jewel's value to be that of the most expensive
jewel that could possibly fit in that setting.32 Thus, the spoliation
inference was born.33 However, although the idea that courts
should sanction spoliators has been around for at least two
centuries, the idea that spoliators should be punished through a
34
separate tort cause of action is fairly new.
B. JurisdictionsAdopting the Spoliation Tort
The first jurisdiction to adopt the independent tort of
spoliation of evidence was California, with the 1984 case of Smith
v. Superior Court.3' The plaintiff, Phyllis Smith, was injured while
driving when a wheel and tire from an oncoming van came loose
and flew into her windshield.36 The impact from the wheel broke
the plaintiffs windshield, causing small pieces of glass to fly into
her eyes and face. 37 As a result of the accident, the plaintiff was
permanently blinded in both eyes and her sense of smell was
irreparably damaged.' One of the defendants, Abbott Ford, who
25. 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). See infra notes 69-78 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of the spoliation tort.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

31. 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).

32. Id. The jury did exactly that. Id.
33. This is an illustration of the maxim contra spoliatorem omnia
praesumuntur, or "everything most to his disadvantage is to be presumed
against the destroyer." BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1401 (6th ed. 1990).
34. Nancy Melgaard, Spoliation of Evidence-An Independent Tort?, 67
N.D. L. REV. 501, 502 (1991). Courts have traditionally been very intolerant

of evidence spoliation. Id. at 501.
35. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).

36. Id. at 831.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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had customized the van's wheels, promised the plaintiff to
preserve certain parts of the van so that an expert for the plaintiff
could examine them.39 However, Abbott Ford, after making this
promise and knowing that the parts were to be used in a suit, later
lost or destroyed the parts. ' ° Thus, plaintiff was unable to
examine the van to determine the cause of the accident.4'
The plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint, which
included a count entitled "Tortious Interference with Prospective
Civil Action By Spoliation of Evidence." 42 Abbott Ford demurred to
that count, contending that the named cause of action did not
exist.43 The trial court sustained the demurrer." The appellate
court, however, overruled the trial court by recognizing that this
cause of action did in fact exist. 4 The court stated that in light of46
California's recognition that "for every wrong there is a remedy,"
and in light of precedent holding that a criminal destruction of
evidence statute did not provide a private right of action,47 it was
appropriate for the court to recognize a private cause of action for
spoliation of evidence. 48 Thus, by recognizing the tort of spoliation
of evidence, California acknowledged that the right to bring a

39. Id.

The court ordered Abbott Ford to "maintain securely in [its] care,

possession, custody and control for later examination and testing by Plaintiffs'
technical experts the left rear tire and wheel, lug bolts, lug nuts and brake

drum." Id. at 832.
40. 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The complaint alleged that Abbott Ford had
"willfully, wrongfully, and intentionally, and with conscious disregard of the

probable serious harm to Plaintiffs ... lost, destroyed or otherwise disposed of
the physical evidence which they had promised to maintain for Plaintiffs." Id.
at 832.
41. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 832.
44. Id. The trial court dismissed without leave to amend as to the
spoliation of evidence count, ruling "that such an intentional tort did not
exist." Id.
45. Id. The appellate court quoted Dean Prosser, stating that "[wIhen it
becomes clear that the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection

against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will
not of itself operate as a bar to the remedy." Id. (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 3-4 (4th ed. 1971)).

46. Id. (citing CAL. CiV. CODE § 3523 (West 1997).
47. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (discussing Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959)). The destruction of evidence is an "'obstruction of justice'

for which only the state can prosecute . . . ." Id. Moreover, the criminal
penalty is only a misdemeanor, and is thus only a minimal deterrent to a
party who can possibly gain a great deal financially by destroying of
incriminating evidence. Id. at 835.

48. Id. at 837.. The court also stated that because "spoliation of evidence is
a form of obstruction of justice, an act of [it] has a devastating effect on a
potential plaintiff and could prevent ... a prospective plaintiff from filing any

suit at all." Id. at 835.
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49
lawsuit is a legally protected interest.
Spoliation of evidence injures this right by substantially
impairing a plaintiffs existing lawsuit or a plaintiffs ability to
bring a lawsuit. 50 In Abbott Ford's case, the court held that
Abbott's actions unreasonably interfered with Smith's ability to
file and win her lawsuit."' The court referred to this protected
interest as a valuable "probable expectancy." 2
Other courts
adopting this tort have also recognized the need to protect this
"probable expectancy.
Several other jurisdictions have followed California's lead in
adopting this tort.' These include Alaska," Florida, 6 Ohio, 7 New
Mexico, 9 an appellate court in Texas,'9 and a federal court in

49. Wilson, supra note 15, at 974.
50. Id.
51. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837. "[Tlhe spoliation tort is a tort of
interference." Wilson, supra note 15, at 974. Spoliation of evidence thus
interferes with a plaintiffs expectancies of future recovery or with
expectancies of successfully defending a lawsuit. Id. at 975.
52. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837. The court equated the tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence with the tort of "intentional interference with
prospective business advantage." Id. at 836. This tort protects the probable
expectancy of a prospective business advantage; in pleading this cause of
action, a plaintiff need only allege that but for the defendant's acts, the
plaintiff would have obtained a contract or profit. Id. See infra notes 204-07
and accompanying text for further discussion of the similarities between the
spoliation tort and the tort of interference with prospective business
advantage.
53. See, e.g., Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 464 (Alaska 1986) (stating
that the plaintiffs prospective civil actions were valuable probable
expectancies, the tampering with which could be remedied in tort). A probable
expectancy is a logical belief that a person will profit from the occurrence of
some event which he reasonably expects to occur. Maurcie L. Kervin,
Spoliation of Evidence: Why Mississippi Should Adopt the Tort, 63 MISS. L.J.
227,228 (1993).
54. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text for a list of the
jurisdictions that have adopted the spoliation tort. But see LaRaia v. Superior
Court, 722 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz. 1986) (rejecting the spoliation tort due to the
adequacy of existing remedies for evidence spoliation); Murphy v. Target
Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (refusing to recognize a
spoliation tort absent a duty on defendant's part to preserve evidence); Koplin
v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Kan. 1987) (refusing to
recognize a spoliation tort "absent a duty on the defendant's part to preserve
possible evidence"); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795, 799
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to recognize a spoliation tort under the facts of
the case at bar); and Weigl v. Quincy Specialties Co., 601 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776-77
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (refusing to adopt the spoliation tort on the facts
presented, but stating that a valid claim for spoliation could be stated if
plaintiff could show intentional conduct on defendant's part designed to
disrupt plaintiffs case).
55. Hazen v. Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986).
56. Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
57. Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993).
58. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995).
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Kansas. ° In addition, New Jersey indicated in Viviano v. CBS,
Inc.61 that it would accept the tort of spoliation of evidence if given
the chance and the proper facts.62
Illinois has also indicated in several cases (most recently in
Boyd v. Traveler's Insurance Company)61 that it would accept the
spoliation tort if presented with the proper circumstances.6 4 In
fact, Illinois has refused to accept the tort on narrow factual
grounds in several cases.6" However, in several cases, Illinois
59. Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. App. 1997). But see Malone v.
Foster, 956 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tex. App. 1997) (refusing to follow Ortega's lead
in adopting the spoliation tort).
60. Foster v. Lawrence Mem'l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831 (D. Kan. 1992).
61. 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
62. The court stated that "[i]mmunizing the willful destruction or
concealment of evidence would not further the policy of encouraging
testimonial candor." Viviano, 597 A.2d at 549. Although the particular form
of obstruction of justice at issue in this case was the concealment, not the
spoliation, of evidence, the court discussed the spoliation tort with favor,
implying that it would accept the spoliation tort if presented with the right
facts. Id. at 549. New Jersey subsequently recognized an analogous tort, that
of fraudulent concealment of evidence, in Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 628
A.2d 1108, 1119 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993). The New Jersey court
reasoned that in cases of spoliation where the plaintiffs spoliated certain
evidence, the spoliation tort is inapplicable. Id. The court stated that because
the spoliation tort protects a litigant's interest in bringing a prospective cause
of action, the spoliation tort is thus inapplicable where the only interference is
with a defendant's ability to defend against a lawsuit. Id. Rather, the
defendant's solution is a cause of action for the intentional interference with
civil discovery. Id. Illinois presumably would not follow this approach.
Although Illinois does not yet recognize a spoliation tort, Illinois courts will
impose sanctions on either party if it spoliates evidence, regardless of whether
that party is a plaintiff or defendant. See, e.g., Jones v. Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co., 966 F.2d 220, 225 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant's noncompliance with protective orders justified the trial court's imposition of a
directed verdict in favor of plaintiffs); Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679, 681
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that where plaintiffs destroyed a defective product
in a products liability action, the trial court was correct in barring the
plaintiffs from presenting any evidence concerning the product). Thus, it
seems that Illinois courts would extend this equal treatment to a spoliation
tort, and would allow defendants as well as plaintiffs to claim its protection.
63. 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995). See infra note 65 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the cases that rejected the tort on narrow factual grounds.
64. The court stated that the current cause of action could be "stated under
existing negligence law," rather than through the creation of a new tort. Boyd,
652 N.E.2d at 270. The court then stated that although the plaintiffs'
complaint described the defendants' conduct as "willful and wanton," the
plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts from which the jury or the court could
infer intentional conduct. Id. at 273. Thus, the plaintiffs failed to state a
cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence. Id. See infra notes 91100 and accompanying text for further examination of the court's decision in
Boyd.
65. See, e.g., Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 597 N.E.2d 616, 619 (Ill. 1992)
(holding that plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action in a statute, rather than
a new tort); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 501 N.E.2d 1312, 1321 (Ill. App.
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courts have found a duty on the part of the defendant to preserve
evidence,66 thus indicating a trend toward acceptance of the
spoliation tort." The Boyd court stated that one reason it could
not adopt the spoliation tort at that time was that the plaintiffs
had not sufficiently proved intentional conduct on the part of the
defendants; thus, the plaintiffs had not satisfied the intent
element of the tort.68 A plaintiff must satisfy each of five elements
in order to establish a cause of action under this tort.
C. Elements of the Tort
The five elements of the intentional spoliation tort were first
set out in Solano v. Delancy. 9 There, the court listed the elements
as:
pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff; knowledge by
the defendant of the existence or likelihood of the litigation;
intentional 'acts of spoliation' [or destruction of the evidence] on the
part of the defendant [that are] designed to disrupt the plaintiffs
case; [actual] disruption of the plaintiffs case; and damages
proximately caused by the acts of the defendant. 70
The first of these elements is satisfied if future litigation is at
all reasonably foreseeable. 71 The second element can be inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the underlying events of the
case.7 ' The third element may be satisfied in two ways: one, the
defendant must reasonably foresee that the spoliated evidence will
Ct. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff did not allege sufficient injury to state a
cause of action in spoliation of evidence); Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d 178, 183
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (stating that the plaintiff had not yet lost her underlying
malpractice claim, and therefore stated no actual injury).
66. See Petrik, 501 N.E.2d at 1319 (finding a duty to preserve evidence in
the supreme court rules governing discovery); Fox, 406 N.E.2d at 181 (deriving
a duty to preserve evidence from various hospital regulations and the
accreditation standards of the American Hospital Association); Rodgers, 597
N.E.2d at 619 (finding a statutory duty to preserve evidence in the x-ray
Retention Act (210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994)).
67. Cohn, supra note 16, at 130.
68. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 273.
69. 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
70. Id. at 729. Because the court in Smith equated the spoliation tort with
the tort of intentional interference with prospective business advantage, the
Solano court inferred the spoliation elements from those of the business tort.
Id. (citing Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal Rptr. 829, 836 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984)). See also Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Intentional Spoliation of
Evidence, Interfering With Prospective Civil Action, As Actionable, 70 A.L.R.
4TH 984 (1990) (listing the elements of the intentional spoilation tort).
71. Melgaard, supra note 34, at 505-06. If the possibility of future litigation
is reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, a duty to preserve evidence will be
imposed on the defendant. Id. at 506. "The most important factor in
establishing a duty to preserve evidence is the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff if the evidence is lost." Cohn, supra note 16, at 130.
72. Melgaard, supra note 34, at 506.
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be used against him; and two, the defendant must intend to affect
the plaintiff, as indicated by the totality of the circumstances.73
The fourth element may be satisfied by evidence of actual
disruption in the plaintiffs case due to the spoliated evidence.74
The fifth element, that of damages, presents "the most
troubling aspect" of the spoliation tort.5 The damages in a
spoliation of evidence case consist of "the inability to prove or
defend [the underlying] lawsuit" for which the evidence is
needed."6 The Smith court recognized the difficulty in proving
damages in general, and especially in cases such as the one at bar,
where the plaintiff had not yet lost the underlying product liability
case on which the spoliation claim was based. 7 Thus, the Smith
court stated that the plaintiff in a spoliation case need only prove
his or her "damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference."78
Although Illinois courts have not yet accepted the spoliation
tort, several court decisions have found a duty to preserve
evidence, and thus have imposed liability for spoliation of
evidence.7 9 For example, in American Family Insurance Co. v.
Village Pontiac GMC, Inc.,"o where the plaintiffs destroyed the
evidence on which their products liability suit was based, the court
imposed a duty on the plaintiffs to preserve evidence. 8' This duty
was based on the fact that the plaintiffs knew the evidence would
be needed in their own products liability suit. 8 Thus, the court
found a duty to preserve evidence based on the foreseeability of
litigation. 3 Similarly, in Shelbyville Mutual Insurance Co. v.

73. Id. However, one author has suggested that "courts should require
plaintiffs ... prove that the defendant intended to produce the harm or knew

with substantial certainty that the harm ... would follow." Pofahl, supra note
16, at 973.
74. Melgaard, supra note 34, at 507.

75. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835. The most difficult aspect of any court's
recognition of a cause of action for intentional spoliation of evidence is
computing "the requisite tort element of damages proximately resulting from

[the] defendant's alleged act [of spoliation]." Id.
76. Margaret O'Mara Frossard & Neal S. Gainsberg, Spoliation of Evidence
in Illinois: The Law After Boyd v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 28 LOY. U. CHI.

L.J. 685, 712 (1997).
77. Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 835.

78. Id. One author characterizes the Smith court's damages discussion as
adopting the rationale of legal malpractice cases, which is that damages

should "be measured by the amount that could have been recovered in the
underlying action." Pofahl, supra note 16, at 976.
79. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text for an explanation of

where courts have found a duty to preserve evidence.
80. 585 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).

81. Id. at 1118.
82. Id. In imposing the duty to preserve evidence, the court also considered
the importance of the evidence to the party seeking to have it produced. Id.
83. Id. The "plaintiffs should have known that potential defendants...
would want to inspect the alleged defect, as [the] plaintiffs experts had done."
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Sunbeam Leisure Products Co.,' the court imposed a duty to
preserve evidence based on the plaintiff insurance company's
destruction of the evidence.85 Because the plaintiffs insurance
company knew that the plaintiffs would likely file a products
liability lawsuit, the insurance company was under a duty to
preserve the allegedly defective product for inspection."" Further,
in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Corp.,87 the court imposed a
duty to preserve evidence on the plaintiffs' insurance company. 88
Because Allstate, as the plaintiffs' insurer, knew that the plaintiffs
might bring a products liability suit against the manufacturer of
the defective product, the court held that Allstate should have
known or foreseen that the defendant would need to examine the
remains of the product. 9 Thus, the court held that the insurance
company had a duty to preserve the evidence. °
The most definitive Illinois case discussing the duty to
preserve evidence is Boyd v. Traveler's Insurance Co. 1 In that
case, the court stated that "a duty to preserve evidence may arise
through an agreement, a contract, a statute, or another special
circumstance." 29 Furthermore, the court stated that a duty to
preserve evidence may also arise through the defendant's own
"affirmative conduct."" Thus, in those situations where a duty to
preserve evidence arises, the possibility of litigation must also be
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.94 Also, the duty to
Id.
84. 634 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
85. Id. at 1322. The insurance company had shipped to several experts a
defective grill, alleged to have started a fire that destroyed part of the
plaintiffs' house. Id. at 1321-22. By the time the grill reached the defendant
manufacturer's expert, the grill was missing the "operating propane tank, the
regulator, a second burner, [and] the wooden grill frame." Id. Due to the
insurance company's actions resulting in the loss of a portion of the grill, the
defendant may have lost an affirmative defense regarding what actually
caused the fire. Id. at 1324.
86. Id.
87. 53 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 1995).
88. Id. at 807.
89. Id.
90. Id. Because the insurance company had not yet determined the actual
cause of the fire, Allstate had a duty under Illinois law to preserve all evidence
of the fire and any alternate causes other than the defective product. Id.
91. 652 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. 1995).
92. Id. at 270-71.
93. Id. at 271. "In any of the foregoing instances, a defendant owes a duty
of due care to preserve evidence if a reasonable person in the defendant's
position should have foreseen that the evidence was material to a potential
civil action." Id. The New Jersey court has extended this duty to preserve
evidence even further, stating that the duty arises regardless of whether there
is an agreement or court order to preserve such evidence. Hirsch, 628 A.2d at
1116. Thus, all that is needed to establish a duty is the foreseeability of harm.
Id.
94. Melgaard, supra note 34, at 505-06.
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preserve evidence arises "if a reasonable person in the defendant's
position should have foreseen that the evidence was material to
potential civil litigation." 9
Therefore, Illinois courts have
established the first element of the spoliation tort.
The Boyd court also discussed the issue of causation and
damages.96 The court stated that "a plaintiff must demonstrate...
that but for the defendant's loss or destruction of the evidence, the
plaintiff had a reasonable probability of succeeding in the
underlying suit."97 The defendant's spoliation of evidence must
have caused the plaintiff to be unable to prove the underlying
lawsuit.9 8 Furthermore, a plaintiff must prove this before the
plaintiff has even lost the underlying case.9 9 However, this also
means that the plaintiff is permitted to bring a spoliation claim
"concurrently with the underlying lawsuit.""'
This process,
however, is extremely confusing and cumbersome. The spoliation
tort is, overall, a much more effective remedy for the spoliation or
destruction of evidence.

II. OTHER REMEDIES FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE AND WHY
THESE REMEDIES ARE INADEQUATE
Illinois courts have developed several remedies other than a
spoliation tort to deal with evidence spoliation.91 These remedies
include: discovery sanctions such as preclusion of evidence or even
T

95. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271. The main issue seems to be whether the
defendant had notice - both of impending litigation and of the relevance of
evidence in his possession. Heffiefinger, supra note 20, at 8.
96. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271. See also Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 836

(relaxing the proof of causation so that a plaintiff need only allege that a
"reasonable probability" existed that s/he would have obtained compensatory

damages but for the defendant's spoliation of evidence).
97. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271 n.2.
98. Id. at 271. Thus, the defendant must have spoliated a key piece of
evidence that is highly relevant to the determination of the underlying

lawsuit. Id. This is the actual damage that plaintiff must allege. Id. at 272.
99. Id.
100. Id. This also means that the same trier of fact will hear both claims.
Id. The court reasoned that "a single trier of fact would be in the best position
to resolve all claims fairly and consistently." Id. But see Mayfield v. Acme
Barrel Co., 629 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Fox v. Cohen, 406 N.E.2d

178, 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that a plaintiff must first lose the
underlying claim before s/he is able to allege harm in terms of a spoliation
claim).
101. See infra notes 102-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of other
remedies for spoliation of evidence. One main problem with any of these

remedies, however, is that none are effective in a situation where a non-party
third person destroys or spoliates evidence. Frossard & Gainsberg, supra note
76, at 686. There are three main purposes behind spoliation remedies: to
restore the accuracy of the discovery process; to compensate the spoliation
victim; and to punish the spoliator. Casamassima, supra note 14, at 239-40.
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dismissal of the complaint; 1 2 adverse jury inferences; 1 3 statutes
such as the x-ray Retention Act; 0 4 and criminal penalties.'0 '
Furthermore, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that a claim
"for negligent spoliation can be stated under existing negligence
law."0 6
However, these remedies are ineffective in deterring the
widespread problem of spoliation of evidence. 0 7 One general
drawback to the traditional remedies for spoliation of evidence is
that they do not have any effect in a situation where a third
person, not a party to the action, has destroyed or spoliated the
evidence.'
Moreover, these remedies are only effective if enough
evidence remains to enable the innocent party to continue with his
suit or defense.0 9 Finally, some judges are reluctant to punish
parties severely for the spoliation of evidence." '
This Part briefly explains each of these remedies and why
they are inadequate to deter spoliation of evidence. Section A
discusses the discovery sanctions that are available to the court
and the reasons for their ineffectiveness."' Section B examines
the adverse jury inference instruction and the problems inherent
in this instruction."2 Section C discusses the statutory remedy of

102. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219 (1996): Consequences of Refusal to Comply with
Rules or Order Relating to Discovery or Pretrial Conferences. See infra notes
115-139 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discovery rules. When
imposing sanctions, Illinois courts adhere to the "public policy of preserving
evidence [to avoid] prejudice in either prosecuting or defending an action."
Heffiefinger, supra note 20, at 1.
103. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civil 3d) 5.00-5.01: Failure to
Testify or Produce Evidence and Failure to Produce Evidence or a Witness.
104. 210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994).
105. 720 ILCS 5/31-4 (West 1994).
106. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270. The Court held that "an action for negligent
spoliation [of evidence could] be stated under existing negligence law" without
creating a new tort. Id.
107. Nesson, supra note 15, at 793. Moreover, in imposing any remedy,
courts will generally choose the least severe sanction possible to remedy
prejudice. David A. Bell et al., An Update on Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois,
85 ILL. B.J. 530, 531 (1997). Furthermore, in order to impose a remedy for
spoliation of evidence, the "act [of spoliation] must... be defined as illegal
[based either on a statute or on a pre-existing common law] duty to preserve
evidence." Spencer, supra note 12, at 44.
108. Frossard & Gainsberg, supra note 76, at 686.
109. Id. at 688.
110. Nesson, supra note 15, at 795. According to Nesson, "[c]ourts have gone
to great lengths to avoid imposing severe punishments on spoliators. For
example, courts have conflated the compensatory and punitive rationales for
sanctioning spoliation, adopting whichever rationale justified imposing
minimal sanctions or no sanctions at all under the particular circumstances at
hand." Id. at 799.
111. See infra notes 128-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
ineffectiveness of discovery sanctions.
112. See infra notes 141-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of
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the x-ray Retention Act, and asserts that this statute is ineffective
at deterring spoliation."' Finally, section D examines criminal
penalties for the destruction or spoliation of evidence.' Section D
also explains why these criminal penalties are inapplicable to a
civil case.
A. Discovery Sanctions
In making the decision to impose sanctions on a spoliating
party, Illinois courts consider two factors: whether the alleged
spoliator knew that the evidence would be relevant to a potential
case and the degree of prejudice to the nonspoliator."' In imposing
sanctions, Illinois courts primarily attempt to reduce the degree of
prejudice suffered by the non-spoliator. 116 If a party proves that he
suffered prejudice in either prosecuting or defending his case, then
Illinois courts will generally impose sanctions regardless of
whether the spoliation occurred before or after the suit was filed." 7
problems inherent in the spoliation inference instruction.
113. See infra notes 165-76 for an examination of the limited spoliation
remedy provided by the X-Ray Retention Act.
114. See infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of why
criminal penalties are ineffective to deter spoliation in civil litigation.
115. Heffiefinger, supra note 20, at 1. Illinois courts feel that it is
insignificant whether the destruction of the evidence was intentional or
inadvertent. Id. at 1-2. See lain D. Johnston, Federal Courts' Authority to
Impose Sanctions for Prelitigation or Preorder Spoliation of Evidence, 156
F.R.D. 313 (1994) (discussing sanctions available to the federal courts).
116. Hefflefinger, supra note 20, at 1. Most Illinois court decisions
demonstrate that the courts are willing to impose sanctions even when the
spoliated evidence was not intentionally destroyed. Id. at 1-2.
117. See, e.g., Stegmiller v. H.P.E., Inc., 401 N.E.2d 1156, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (holding that where the plaintiffs lawyer in a product liability suit lost
the allegedly defective product before suit was filed, then waited three years
before informing defendant, plaintiffs conduct reflected an "unreasonable
noncompliance with the discovery process, thus warranting dismissal of the
complaint"); Ralston v. Casanova, 473 N.E.2d 444, 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(granting summary judgment in favor of defendants and barring expert's
testimony because expert violated a court order by disassembling an allegedly
defective seat belt assembly); Arguetta v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal
R.R., 586 N.E.2d 386, 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that even though
defendant's destruction of evidence was unintentional, the testimony of
defendant's expert would still be barred; the court stated that a "trial court is
not required to find that a party intentionally destroyed evidence in order for
the court to bar testimony regarding that evidence"); Graves v. Daley, 526
N.E.2d 679, 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that where the plaintiffs'
insurance company told them to destroy an allegedly defective furnace, the
plaintiffs were barred from presenting any evidence of the furnace's condition;
the court stated that "preservation of an allegedly defective product is of the
utmost importance in both proving and defending against a strict liability
action"); American Family Ins. v. Village Pontiac GMC, Inc. 585 N.E.2d 1115,
1118 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that where plaintiffs insurance company
destroyed evidence, the court could bar testimony as to the car's condition; the
court stated that even without a court order to preserve evidence, "court[s]
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Courts will impose punitive discovery sanctions if the destroyed
evidence is highly relevant to the case and the non-spoliator has
been prejudiced."8 Courts will also impose discovery sanctions
where the destruction of evidence is in violation of a court
preservation order." 9
The power of Illinois courts to sanction spoliators derives from
the Discovery Rules of the Illinois Supreme Court.12 ° Furthermore,
the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to
issue sanctions; that decision will not be overturned "absent [a
finding of] abuse of discretion."121
Rule 219 of the discovery rules empowers the court to take
several actions upon a showing that a party has refused to comply
with a court order or rule. The court may order: a stay of further
proceedings pending compliance; a default, barring further
pleadings relating to that issue; the dismissal of a claim or
counterclaim relating to that issue; the exclusion of certain
testimony concerning that issue; a default judgment or dismissal
against the offending party; or that any relevant portion of the
offending party's pleadings be stricken and judgment be entered as
to that issue.'22 These sanctions are to be imposed only when the
original court order was just, but the spoliator's noncompliance is
unreasonable.123 Finally, "the purpose behind imposing discovery
sanctions is to ensure that full discovery occurs." 4 Therefore, the
purpose of Rule 219 is to help the discovery process rather than to
punish the offending party. 125 At the same time, however, the
court must not hesitate to impose sanctions for serious discovery

may focus on the importance of the information a party is seeking to have
produced" in deciding whether to issue sanctions).
118. Frossard & Gainsberg, supra note 76, at 697.

119. Id. at 698. The amount of prejudice that the non-spoliator must prove
he suffered due to the spoliation varies depending on whether the spoliation
was in violation of a court preservation order. Id. at 699.
120. ILL. SUP. CT. R., Article II: Rules on Civil Proceedings in the Trial

Court.
121. Ruperd v. Ryan, 683 N.E.2d 166, 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
122. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c).
123. Stegmiller v. H.P.E., Inc., 401 N.E.2d 1156, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
"'Unreasonable noncompliance' has been construed as conduct which indicates
a deliberate and pronounced disregard for the rule or order not complied with.
[citation omitted] A 'just order' has been defined as one which insures both
discovery and a trial on the merits." Id. A showing of the unreasonableness of
a party's noncompliance with a discovery order depends upon "how important
the undisclosed evidence was to the other party." Farley Metals, Inc. v.
Barber Colman Co., 645 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
124. Ruperd, 683 N.E.2d at 171. However, if this "were really the case, it
would seem that discovery sanctions would not be imposed if the evidence had
been fully destroyed, because it would be impossible for full discovery to

occur." Id.
125. FarleyMetals, 645 N.E.2d at 967.
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violations. 12 6 Thus, in deciding on the proper sanction to be issued,
Illinois trial courts12must try to obtain full discovery leading to a
7
trial on the merits.
However, there are several limits to the court's ability to issue
sanctions which reduce their effectiveness. If an innocent party in
a spoliation case does not establish that she suffered prejudice due
to the spoliation, then Illinois courts will not impose discovery
Also, Illinois courts will generally not impose
sanctions.' 2'
sanctions where the court finds that the spoliator neither knew
nor should have known that the spoliated evidence would be
relevant to litigation. 129 Furthermore, some cases have focused on
the type of conduct of the spoliator in deciding whether to impose
sanctions; for example, the United States Supreme Court has
stated that sanctions are only appropriate where the spoliator
Thus, the mere loss of
acted with willfulness, bad faith, or fault.'
evidence, by itself, does not warrant the imposition of sanctions.'
Moreover, if there is no pre-existing court order to protect
evidence, then a court may not assert any sanctions. 32 Only in a
few cases have Illinois courts been willing to impose sanctions for
spoliation of evidence where there was no pre-existing court
order.'33 However, these few cases all turn on the fact that the
party who destroyed the evidence prior to a court order had notice
that the spoliated evidence was material to pending litigation.13
126. Id. Illinois courts hope that the imposition of discovery sanctions will
act as a deterrent to other parties contemplating the violation of discovery
rules. Id. at 967-68.
127. Id. at 968.
128. Heffiefinger, supra note 20, at 4. See H & H Sand and Gravel v. Coyne

Cylinder, 632 N.E.2d 697, 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that "when the
alteration or destruction of evidence does not prevent a party from

establishing its case, there has been no prejudice.").
129. Heffiefinger, supra note 20, at 4. For example, in Heins v. Bolton, the
court refused to issue a sanction barring plaintiffs expert witness from

testifying where a third party removed and presumbably destroyed evidence of
the cause of a fire. 1998 WL 832422, *4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). The third party
had no knowledge of impending litigation. Id.

130. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S.
639, 640 (1976).
131. Hefflefinger, supra note 20, at 5.
132. Scott S. Katz & Anne Marie Muscaro, Spoliage of Evidence - Crimes,
Sanctions, Inferences, and Torts, 29 TORTS & INS. L.J. 51, 55 (1993). This is
because a party who spoliates evidence before the discovery request is
physically unable to comply with such a request or court order. John K.
Stipancich, The Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: An Independent Tort Action
May Be the Only Acceptable Alternative, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135, 1139 (1992).
133. See Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679, 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (stating
that parties are not allowed to destroy evidence simply because no court order

was issued to protect it).
134. Id.; see also Ralston v. Casanova, 473 N.E.2d 444, 449 (Ill. App. Ct.

1984); Stegmiller v. H.P.E., Inc., 401 N.E.2d 1156, 1158-59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
Thus, the possibility of litigation was reasonably foreseeable to these
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Finally, although one purpose behind discovery sanctions is to
deter parties from violating discovery rules, deterrence is often
ineffective. 3 ' Sanctions are ineffective in deterring spoliation
mainly because courts impose them with the goal of aiding
"discovery rather than punishing the spoliator." 36 Furthermore,
courts only impose sanctions when they find that the spoliator's
"noncompliance with discovery rules or orders is unreasonable."137
Moreover, because most cases settle before trial begins, the
spoliator's risk of being caught is minimal; even if his act of
spoliation is discovered before settlement, in general the court will
merely order the spoliator to disclose the evidence if at all
possible.""
Courts will only impose the drastic sanction of
dismissal or default judgment in those cases where the spoliator's
"actions show a deliberate, contumacious, or unwarranted
disregard of the court's authority."3 9 Sanctions which do not
seriously punish a party for spoliation of evidence have little or no
deterrent effect. Similarly, another possible remedy for spoliation,
that of the adverse jury inference instruction, has little, if any,
effect on deterrence of the spoiiation of evidence. 140
B.

Adverse Jury Inference

In general, the intentional spoliation of evidence that is
material to a case raises an inference that this evidence would
have been unfavorable to the spoliator's defense or cause of
action. 14 Thus, in certain cases of spoliation, Illinois courts can
defendants; this foreseeability imposed the duty to preserve evidence. Id.
135. Nesson, supra note 15, at 795. "Civil discovery presents powerful
incentives to spoliate evidence." Id.
136. Wakefield v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 592 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992). Also, sanctions do not compensate the injured party in a spoliation
case, primarily because sanctions for evidence spoliation do not compare "to
the potential loss of an entire cause of action." Stipancich, supra note 132, at
1139. In other words, monetary sanctions will almost never match what the
plaintiffs actual damages may have been. Melissa A. Bruzzano, Spoliation of
Evidence in California,24 Sw. U. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994).
137. Applegate v. Seaborn, 477 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
138. Nesson, supra note 15, at 796. "Suppression [or spoliation of evidence]
will deprive the opponent of valuable evidence and will promote a favorable
settlement; settlement will produce closure that effectively seals the case." Id.
139. Wakefield, 592 N.E.2d at 542.
However, this sanction lets the
defendant off lightly, as damages are difficult to assess and the spoliated
evidence may have induced a jury to assign higher damages. Nesson, supra
note 15, at 801-02. Moreover, no matter how severe the sanction that is
imposed, it can never replace evidence that has been lost or destroyed. Jones
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 966 F.2d 220, 225 (7th Cir. 1992). Finally,
the default judgment can only be issued after the spoliator fails to obey both a
discovery request and a court order to compel discovery. Stipancich, supra
note 132, at 1139.
140. Nesson, supra note 15, at 794-95.
141. Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Presumption or
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apply an "adverse jury inference" instruction.1 4 2 Under particular
enumerated circumstances, "a presumption arises that the
14
evidence a party fails to produce would be unfavorable to him."
These circumstances are: whether the evidence was under the
control of the spoliating party and could have been produced by
him with reasonable diligence; whether the spoliated evidence
"was not equally available to the adverse party;" whether a
"reasonably prudent person under the same or similar
circumstances would have offered the evidence if he believed it to
be favorable to him;" and whether any "reasonable excuse for the
failure has been shown." 44 An innocent party must satisfy all four
145
of these criteria in order for the judge to issue this instruction.
The presumption will not apply if the evidence is "equally
available" to either party.146 Whether to give this instruction is
within the discretion
of the trial court, 47 subject to reversal only
48
abuse.
its
upon
Courts have employed the adverse jury inference in medical
malpractice cases. 4 9 This is because "obtaining [medical] records
in their original condition" is imperative to the resolution of
liability and damages issues. 5' However, the tampering of medical
records is a frequent problem."' One solution to this problem is
the adverse jury inference, in which the intentional spoliation of
medical records is seen as evidence of the defendant's

Inference From Failure of Hospital or Doctor to Produce Relevant Medical
Records, 69 A.L.R. 4TH 906 (1990). The inference arises out of a theory that a
party's intentional loss, destruction, or spoliation of evidence can be used

against that party to demonstrate his awareness of the weakness of his case.
22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT AND KENNETH
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5178 (1978).

W.

GRAHAM,

JR.,

FEDERAL

142. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civil 3d) 5.01: Failure to Produce

Evidence or a Witness. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions should only be used
as originally worded where they "correctly and accurately charge the jury."
Ruperd v. Ryan, 683 N.E.2d 166, 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).

143. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civil 3d) 5.00: Failure to Testify or
Produce Evidence.
144. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civil 3d) 5.01: Failure to Produce
Evidence or a Witness.
145. Pietrzak v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 670 N.E.2d 1254,
1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); see Chiricosta v. Winthrop-Breon, 635 N.E.2d 1019,
1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

146. Flynn v. Cusentino, 375 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
147. Cleveringa v. J. I. Case Co., 595 N.E.2d 1193, 1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
148. Pietrzak, 670 N.E.2d at 1260.
149. Fischer, supra note 141, at 906 (discussing medical malpractice cases).
Because the problem of tampering with medical records is widespread in
medical malpractice actions, many courts have applied this rule of evidence.
Id.
150. Sanford M. Gage, Alteration, Falsification,and Fabricationof Records
in Medical MalpracticeActions, 1981 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 476, 477 (1981).
151. Id. at 477.
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consciousness of guilt.'52 One limitation on the use of adverse jury
inference instructions, however, is that they "are warranted only
where the evidence actually exists but is not produced by the only
party to whom it is available." 3 Thus, if a spoliator completely
destroys incriminating evidence, these instructions appear to be
inapplicable."'
Similarly, these instructions are not warranted
where the unproduced evidence would be merely cumulative. 155
Furthermore, Illinois courts will "generally give this [jury]
instruction only if the spoliator intentionally destroyed the
evidence to gain an advantage" in the litigation.5 6 However, if the
evidence is spoliated negligently, then Illinois courts generally will
not give the adverse jury inference instruction, reasoning that it
may provide a windfall to the injured party."7
Another problem with the adverse inference is that it only
works well if the lost or spoliated evidence was not the key piece of
evidence needed to prove the case."5' The inference tells the jury
that the "evidence would have helped the party who wished to
present it.""' However, if the spoliated evidence is the key piece of
evidence needed to prove the case, then the inference is no help. 6'
Finally, if the spoliated evidence is, for example, a medical record,
152. Thor v. Boska, 38 Cal. App. 3d 558, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). A party's
spoliation of evidence "is receivable against him as an indication of his
consciousness That [sic] his case is a weak or unfounded one .... " Id. at 567.
This case also suggests that the burden of proof in such a situation should
shift to the defendant to prove that his negligence is not the cause of plaintiff's
injuries. Id. at 568.
153. Cleveringa v. J. I. Case Co., 595 N.E.2d 1193, 1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
The Court may not issue these jury instructions absent a showing that the
evidence still exists in some form. Id.
154. Id.
155. Chiricosta v. Winthrop-Breon, 635 N.E.2d 1019, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994).
156. Frossard & Gainsberg, supra note 76, at 692. But see Wakefield, 592
N.E.2d at 543 (recognizing IPI 5.01 as a possible solution to unintentional
spoliation of evidence).
157. Frossard & Gainsberg, supra note 76, at 694-95. Without a showing of
the defendant's intent to undermine the pending litigation by his acts of
spoliation, there appears to be no reason to issue a punishment so severe as
the adverse jury inference instruction against the defendant. Id. at 694.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. The inference does not by any means replace the need for the
substantive proof necessary to a plaintiffs case. Cambre, supra note 13, at
607. Furthermore, because whether to give the instruction is left to the
judge's discretion, to be exercised at the end of the presentation of both
parties' cases, "the innocent party must still present the case without that
crucial piece of evidence." Bruzzano, supra note 136, at 124. In fact, the
adverse inference is a rather ineffective remedy because a "plaintiff can not
build a case on a permissive inference alone." Wilson, supra note 15, at 994
(quoting James F. Thompson, Note, Spoilation of Evidence: A Troubling New
Tort, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 563, 572 (1989)).
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without which a plaintiff in Illinois cannot obtain a certificate of
merit to file suit, then the adverse jury inference is no help at all;
if the plaintiff can not even get to the jury, what good is a jury
inference? 1'
The final problem with the adverse jury instruction is that if
necessary evidence is spoliated by a third person who is not a
party to the suit, then the instruction cannot be given.' In such a
situation, the issuance of this instruction would give the nonspoliating injured party a tremendous advantage over her equally
innocent adversary.'63 Thus, in
such a situation, the adverse
64
inference instruction is useless.
However, another remedy for evidence spoliation is statutory;
this is embodied by the x-ray Retention Act.'65 Similar to the
adverse jury inference instruction, however, the x-ray Retention
Act is fairly useless outside of a few specific situations.
C. Statutory Remedies: The X-Ray Retention Act
Illinois employs a statutory remedy specifically for the
spoliation of medical records, in the form of the x-ray Retention
Act. 166 The Act states that hospitals which produce x-rays or
roentgen process 67 photographs at "the request of licensed
physicians for use by them in the diagnosis or treatment of a
patient's illness or condition must retain such films as part of their
regularly maintained records for a period of 5 years."1 6
This statute was enacted in order to prevent the loss of x-ray
161. See Miller v. Gupta, 672 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Ill. 1996) (stating that

without the spoliated x-rays, Miller will never be able to assert a meritorious
cause of action).

162. Frossard & Gainsberg, supra note 76, at 695.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. X-Ray Retention Act, 210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994).
166. Id. This is the only statute that specifically directs hospitals to retain a
certain record. Id. Outside of this Act, Illinois hospitals are "guided by the
policies of the Illinois Hospital Association (IHA)and the American Hospital
Association" regarding record retention. Rallo, supra note 21, at 30.
167. A roentgen process photograph is a film of the "internal structures of
the body, made by passage of x-rays through the body to act on specially
sensitized film." RICHARD SLOANE, THE SLOANE - DORLAND ANNOTATED
MEDICAL - LEGAL DICTIONARY 622 (1987).
168. 210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994). The text of the Act is, in part, as follows:

Hospitals which produce photographs of the human anatomy by the XRay or roentgen process on the request of licensed physicians for use by
them in the diagnosis or treatment of a patient's illness or condition
shall retain such photographs or films as part of their regularly
maintained records for a period of 5 years provided that retention of said

photographs or film may be by microfilm or other recognized means of
minification that does not adversely affect their use for diagnostic
purposes.
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evidence, which is commonly the evidence most crucial to the
success of a medical malpractice claim.1 69 Furthermore, the Illinois
Supreme Court has held that a private cause of action is available
to plaintiffs under the Act. 7 ° In order to plead a cause of action
based on the violation of the x-ray Retention Act, "the plaintiff
must plead and prove an injury and damages proximately caused
by the defendant's loss of [the] x-ray." 7' Furthermore, a plaintiff
has a cause of action against a hospital for violation of this
statute
172
even if the hospital has lost only one x-ray out of many.
However, there are two main problems with the x-ray
Retention Act. 173 One problem is that the Act, by its language,
applies only to x-ray or roentgen process photographs. 174 Thus,
there is no statute dealing with the retention of other kinds of
medical test results. The other problem is that the Act, on its face,
applies only to hospitals, not to private physicians or even
laboratories. 7' Therefore, an injured patient whose x-rays are
disposed of or otherwise
spoliated by the physician has no cause of
176
action under the Act.
Another possible remedy to deal with the spoliation of
evidence is some kind of criminal penalty, such as an obstruction
of justice statute. However, a party injured by spoliation of
evidence has no real cause of action in the criminal arena either.
D. CriminalPenalties
The Illinois legislature has enacted criminal penalties for the
destruction of evidence. 17 7 The obstruction of justice statute states
that "[a] person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent the
apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person,
he ...(a) destroys, alters, conceals or disguises physical
evidence ....,'78Obstruction of justice is designated a Class 4
169. Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp., 597 N.E.2d 597, 619 (Ill. 1992).
170. Id. at 619-20. The court stated that "a private cause of action was
necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the [X-Ray
Retention] Act." Id. The court further stated that a private cause of action
would be "consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act," which was the
prevention of loss of evidence and the protection of plaintiffs in medical
malpractice cases whose x-rays were destroyed while in the defendant
hospital's possession. Id. at 619-20.

171. Id. at 620.
172. Id. The statute requires that all x-rays be preserved; thus the loss of
only one X-Ray is still a violation. Id.
173. 210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994).
174. Id.

175. Id.; see also Miller v. Gupta, 672 N.E.2d 1229, 1233 (Ill. 1996) (stating
that because the defendant was a private physician and not a hospital, the Act

did not apply to him).
176. Miller, 672 N.E.2d at 1233.
177. Obstructing Justice, 720 ILCS 5/31-4 (West 1996).

178. Id.
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felony.'
Thus, any offender can be imprisoned for three to six
180
years.
However, criminal sanctions for the spoliation of evidence in a
civil case are flatly inadequate, due to the fact that there are no
cases where a party was criminally convicted for the spoliation of
evidence in civil litigation."" Thus, even though the destruction of
evidence is a felony carrying a penalty of three to six years of
imprisonment, a criminal penalty is not a solution to spoliation if
the penalty is never issued. Furthermore, a criminal penalty of
jail time fails to compensate the injured party in a civil suit.8 3
Thus, criminal sanctions are an ineffective remedy for the
spoliation of evidence in a civil suit.
It is therefore clear that traditional remedies for evidence
spoliation are ineffective in solving this problem. These remedies
have little or no deterrent effect on a potential spoliator," and the
spoliator in a civil case, if his destruction goes unnoticed, has little
worry of a severe punishment. 8 ' To resolve the persistent and
devastating problem of evidence spoliation, another course of
action is necessary.
M

III. ILLINOIS SHOULD ADOPT THE SPOLIATION TORT
Dean Prosser once stated that "In]ew and nameless torts are
being recognized constantly ...., Once a new, protected interest
is recognized, courts will then grant a new cause of action for the
179. Id.
180. Extended Term, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West 1996).
181. Katz & Muscaro, supra note 132, at 54. Also, criminal penalties are

inadequate simply because they serve a different goal than does a tort action.
Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). "The
purpose behind criminal penalties is to protect and vindicate the interests of
the public as a whole," while the purpose behind the tort action is to
compensate the injured plaintiff herself. Id. Not only does the criminal
penalty not compensate the injured plaintiff, it also does not protect society's
interests as a whole if it is never issued in cases of spoliation. Katz &
Muscaro, supra note 132, at 54.
182. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2 (West 1996).
183. Katz & Muscaro, supra note 132, at 54. Moreover, any possible
exposure to a criminal penalty that a spoliator may have may instead be

outweighed by the possible advantage that he will receive by his act of
spoliation. Id. Also, because in many states the penalty for spoliation of
evidence is a misdemeanor, not a felony, these penalties are minor compared
to a money judgment in a civil suit. Id.
184. Nesson, supra note 15, at 794-95. The process of civil discovery itself
provides too many incentives to spoliate evidence, which sanctions can not
possibly deter. Id. at 795.
185. Katz & Muscaro, supra note 132, at 54. Due to the widespread

disinterest in criminally prosecuting evidence spoliation in civil cases, the
threat of criminal prosecution is, at best, "theoretical." Id.
186. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF LAW AND TORTS § 1, at 3 (4th ed.
1971).
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violation of that protected interest.18 7 Illinois should follow the
lead of several other states and recognize that the right to file a
civil action without interference by spoliation of evidence is a
protected interest.1m
This Part proposes that Illinois adopt the intentional
spoliation tort. Section A discusses reasons why Illinois should
adopt the tort.8 9 Section B examines the similarities between the
spoliation tort and another tort long recognized in Illinois, that of
intentional interference with prospective business relations. 9 '
Finally, Section C discusses how the spoliation tort would solve
the deficiencies of older, less efficient, remedies for evidence
spoliation."'

A. There is a Strong Need for the Spoliation Tort, Particularlyin
Medical MalpracticeActions
The Illinois Supreme Court recently indicated in Boyd v.
Traveler's Insurance Co."'9 that it would adopt the spoliation tort if
given the right facts.'93 Illinois must adopt the spoliation tort in

187. Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF LAW AND TORTS § 1, at 3-4 (4th ed.
1971)). "When it becomes clear that the plaintiffs interests are entitled to
legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the
claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar to a remedy." Id. In order for
the court to step in, the defendant's wrongful act must affect some legal
interest of the plaintiff. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 30 (1974). The purpose behind
adopting the spoliation tort is to allow a victim of spoliation to "recover
damages for the loss of a prospective lawsuit." Bell et al., supra note 107, at
531-32.
188. See, e.g., Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 832. Illinois has a long history of
following California's lead in major tort decisions. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 447 (Ill. 1982) (rejecting strict liability
in tort for purely economic loss). The decision was based squarely on Seely v.
White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. 1965). Id. Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d
886, 896-97 (Ill. 1981) (adopting pure comparative negligence to replace the
doctrine of contributory negligence). The decision was based in part on Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (Cal. 1975). Id. Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1965) (adopting strict liability in tort as a
basis for a cause of action based on a defective product). This decision was
based on Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (Cal. 1963).
Id.
189. See infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text for an examination of
the need for the spoliation tort particularly in medical malpractice cases.
190. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text for an analysis of the
similarities between the spoliation tort and the interference with prospective
business relations tort.
191. See infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
the tort would solve problems left unresolved by other spoliation remedies,
even though some authors feel that existing remedies are adequate to deter
and resolve evidence spoliation. Bell et al., supra note 107, at 532.
192. 652 N.E.2d at 273.
193. See Boyd v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 273 (Ill. 1995) (stating
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order to protect an "individual [party's] right to sue for damages"
caused by the intentional spoliation of evidence. 94 Spoliation of
evidence is extremely prevalent in medical malpractice cases,
where records that the plaintiff needs to prove his case are usually
in the possession of the defendant doctor or hospital.'95 One author
asserted that as many as fifty percent of all medical malpractice
cases involve altered records; of that number, "ten percent
96 of all
malpractice cases deal with fraudulently altered records."0
Miller v. Gupta,97 the facts of which began this Comment,
illustrates the need for a spoliation tort in medical malpractice
cases. In that case, the plaintiff Miller was injured, allegedly by
defendant Dr. Gupta's malpractice.'98 However, the x-rays that
Miller needed in order to file and prove her case were lost by Dr.
Gupta when he placed the x-rays on the ground near his
wastebasket, knowing that the cleaning woman would throw them
out with the rest of his trash. 99 Thus, Miller was unable to file a
malpractice case against Dr. Gupta. °° Furthermore, she could not
even state a cause of action against the doctor under the x-ray
Retention Act 20 because the Act flatly does not apply to private
physicians such as Dr. Gupta.2 ' Finally, if Miller does attempt to

that plaintiffs' complaint failed to establish the tort of intentional spoliation of
evidence due to "factual insufficiency").
194. Philip A. Lionberger, Interference with Prospective Civil Litigation by
Spoliation of Evidence: Should Texas Adopt a new Tort?, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J.

209, 221 (1989). There is no pressing need at this time to adopt the tort of
negligent spoliation of evidence, as Illinois recognizes that a cause of action for
negligent spoliation can be stated under existing negligence law. Boyd, 652
N.E.2d at 270. Thus, in Illinois, negligent spoliation of evidence is a cause of
action in negligence theory, not a separate negligence tort. Frossard &
Gainsberg, supra note 76, at 707. However, a short discussion of the negligent

spoliation tort will be provided here. There are two different contexts in which
negligent spoliation of evidence can arise. Stipancich, supra note 132, at 1140.
One such context is where one party unintentionally spoliates evidence which
then has a favorable result on his position. Id. The second context is that in

which an a disinterested third party spoliates evidence. Id. However, in order
to state a cause of action in negligence in either context, the plaintiff must

first establish a duty on the defendant's part to protect evidence against loss
or destruction. Wilson, supra note 15, at 978-79.
195. Harold L. Hirsh, Tampering with Medical Records, 1978 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 450, 452 (1978).

196. Casamassima, supra note 14, at 236-37. Often, medical records are
altered after suit is filed in an attempt by the doctor to conceal mistakes in
judgment for which he may not even be legally liable. Hirsh, supra note 195,
at 451. However, in the end the record has still been intentionally altered by a

health care provider who is conscious of his possible legal liability. Id.
197. 672 N.E.2d 1229 (Ill. 1996).
198. Id. at 1231.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1232.
201. 210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994).
202. Miller, 672 N.E.2d at 1233.
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state a cause of action under negligence, as per Boyd, she will find
it very difficult to prove that Dr. Gupta had a duty to preserve her
203
x-rays.
Thus, in order to prevent such a situation, and in order to
provide adequate relief to parties in spoliation cases, Illinois must
adopt the spoliation tort.
B. Similarity to the Tort of IntentionalInterference with
Prospective Business Advantage
The California case of Smith v. Superior Court compared the
spoliation tort to the tort of intentional interference with
prospective business advantage. °
Illinois has recognized the
business tort since 1980. °s With this tort, Illinois has declared
that a person's business relationships constitute a property
interest, and as such, they are entitled to protection against undue
interference." 6
The elements of these two torts are very similar, and it would
be both easy and practical to recognize the spoliation tort as an
outgrowth of the interference with prospective business advantage
tort. °7
Thus, because Illinois law already recognizes that
203. Boyd v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 273 (Ill. 1995). Boyd stated
that "a duty to preserve evidence may arise through an agreement, a contract,
a statute," affirmative conduct by the defendant, or another special
circumstance. Id. In Miller's case, there was no contract or agreement
between the patient and the doctor to preserve her x-rays. Miller, 672 N.E.2d
at 1233. Also, there was no applicable statute which imposed a duty on Dr.
Gupta to preserve the x-rays. Id. It remains to be seen whether Miller can
effectively plead either that Dr. Gupta affirmatively undertook to preserve
Miller's x-rays by placing them in a jacket on the floor, or that Dr. Gupta's
conduct fits within the undefined "other special circumstance" of Boyd. Boyd,
652 N.E.2d at 271. Ironically, one of the primary grounds on which some
courts have refused to adopt the spoliation tort is the "absence of a duty to
preserve evidence." Lionberger, supra note 194, at 216-17.
204. Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
This tort allows a plaintiff to recover damages both for interference with
business relationships and for interference with the parties' reasonable
expectations of a business relationship. Id. California first recognized this
tort in 1975. Id.
205. Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
206. Id. at 101. A prospective business relationship imparts to an individual
an expectancy of future economic gain. Id. With the spoliation tort, the
expectancy of future economic gain is the expectancy of winning damages in a
lawsuit; "spoliation of evidence interferes with the plaintiffs right to sue for
damages." Lionberger, supra note 194, at 221.
207. The elements of the tort of interference with prospective business
advantage are: the plaintiff must have a reasonable expectancy of entering
into a valid business relationship, defendant must know of the plaintiffs
expectancy, and defendant must intentionally interfere and destroy the
probable expectancy, thereby causing harm to the plaintiff. Belden, 413
N.E.2d at 101. Compare supra notes 63-100 and accompanying text with
Belden, 413 N.E.2d at 101 (discussing the elements of the spoilation tort).
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prospective business relationships are property rights which
deserve protection, it must expand its analysis to include
prospective civil litigation as a property interest which also
deserves protection. To accomplish this, Illinois must adopt the
tort of intentional spoliation of evidence.
C. Adoption of the Spoliation Tort Would Solve the Deficiencies of
Previous SpoliationRemedies
Adoption of the spoliation tort would protect plaintiffs when
essential evidence is intentionally lost or destroyed by
defendants.2 "8 For example, the spoliation tort would enable
plaintiffs in a medical malpractice case to bring a cause of action
against a private doctor for destruction or loss of x-rays; thus, the
spoliation tort would reach beyond the limited scope of the x-ray
Retention Act."°9 Furthermore, the spoliation tort would not be
limited to x-rays; rather, it would protect plaintiffs against the loss
of other kinds of test results or medical records as well.210
A spoliation tort would also work to deter the intentional
spoliation of evidence by defendants who are attempting to protect
themselves financially. 1'
Spoliators destroy evidence in an
attempt to lessen the dollar amount of their liability, especially if
the expected gain from the loss or destruction of vital evidence is
greater than their chance of being discovered or punished
harshly.1 2 If the knowledge of spoliated evidence failed to provoke
the jury into imposing higher compensatory or punitive damages,
then the spoliator gains a great deal from his destruction of
evidence.2 8" However, if faced with a separate tort cause of action
208. Cohn, supra note 16, at 129. Often, plaintiffs either lose a cause of
action entirely or suffer a diminished recovery, due to the spoliation of

evidence essential to their claim. Id. at 128. Judicial sanctions alone will not
be sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of evidence. Id. at 129.

209. 210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994). The Act applies only to hospitals which
produce x-rays and then lose them. Id. Thus, plaintiffs have no cause of
action under the Act against a private physician who loses x-rays. Miller v.
Gupta, 672 N.E.2d 1229, 1233 (Ill. 1996).
210. 210 ILCS 90/1 (West 1994). The X-Ray Retention Act applies only to x-

rays or roentgen process photographs, not to any other test results or
diagnostic tools. Id.
211. Cohn, supra note 16, at 129. Individuals may believe that "it is more
advantageous to destroy crucial evidence" and address whatever meager
penalty is imposed rather than produce the evidence and suffer a large money

judgment. Rowse, supra note 16, at 191.
212. Nesson, supra note 15, at 795. "Civil discovery presents powerful
incentives to spoliate evidence," which the possibility of sanctions or an

adverse jury inference instruction cannot overcome. Id. In fact, no court has
ever imposed on a spoliator punitive damages that were designed to offset the
expected gain of spoliation. Id. at 803.

213. Id. at 802.

Ironically, if a party is not under a statutory duty to

preserve evidence, his lawyer may, under the guise of zealous representation,

even counsel him to destroy evidence. Rowse, supra note 16, at 194.
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for the destruction of evidence rather than weak sanctions or an
even weaker jury inference instruction, a spoliator will be deterred
from the destruction or spoliation of evidence.
Furthermore, a spoliation tort is a better solution than the
adverse jury inference instruction. The adverse jury inference
instruction is too limited as a remedy for spoliation; moreover, in
many instances the spoliation of evidence prevents a case from
ever getting to the jury.1 Thus, a spoliation tort cause of action
would provide a plaintiff some measure of relief that she would
otherwise be denied.
Finally, a tort cause of action would provide a better remedy
to victims of spoliation than do sanctions. "Sanctions cannot
replace lost evidence" that would have either enabled a plaintiff to
bring a lawsuit or would have substantially increased a damages
award.215 Moreover, if the act of spoliation occurs before a suit is
2
filed, courts will usually not even issue sanctions..
"
Thus, with a
separate spoliation tort remedy, plaintiffs would no longer need to
depend on the court's discretion in issuing sanctions.
CONCLUSION

Traditional remedies to solve or deter spoliation of evidence
are simply ineffective. Sanctions whose imposition are left to the
discretion of the court do not deter a potential spoliator who feels
that his acts will go undiscovered or that his punishment will be
light. An adverse jury inference instruction does not compensate a
plaintiff who no longer has sufficient evidence to take before a
jury. The threat of criminal penalties, if never carried out, is
similarly ineffective. Finally, statutory remedies that apply only
in a limited set of circumstances are inadequate to remedy the
problem of spoliation of evidence.
To truly solve the problem of evidence spoliation, Illinois must
adopt the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. This tort
provides an effective remedy for those plaintiffs who have been
injured by spoliation, yet who are unable to plead a duty on the
defendant's part in order to state a negligence cause of action. The
spoliation tort, particularly in medical malpractice cases, would
provide the most effective remedy for all those who have been
injured by the intentional spoliation of evidence.

214. Cleveringa v. J. I. Case Co., 595 N.E.2d 1193, 1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
Adverse inference instructions can only be given where the requested evidence
actually exists but is simply not produced. Id. Thus, if the requested evidence
has been completely destroyed, and no evidence exists, the adverse inference
instruction is not given. Id.
215. Cohn, supra note 16, at 144.
216. Id.

